New Delhi, April 16 (ANI): The Indian Army is one of the very few armed forces in the world which has been kept on its toes since Independence, engaged in the task of defending the country against foreign aggressors as also helping the government in maintaining peace and order.
At the dawn of Independence the Indian Army had to look after refugees who came from Pakistan and prevent communal disturbances within the country. Before the country could settle down, the army had to rush to Jammu and Kashmir to defend the state, which had acceded to India, against 'raiders', who were backed by personnel from the Pakistan Army.
The cease-fire in Jammu and Kashmir, which was accepted at the end of 1949, hardly saw any peace. India had to face aggression from China in 1962, in the North East and in Ladakh in the north. Today, the India-China border continues to be sensitive.
There has been no respite insofar as the India-Pakistan border is concerned. India has had to fight three wars with Pakistan in 1965, 1971 and in 1999.
Even though the Indian Army has been deployed to aid the civil authority in various situations ever since Independence, the basic training of the Indian 'soldier' has been to fight the 'enemy' of the country. The Jawan, as the soldier is commonly referred to, generally looks for a 'dushman' while he is deployed.
Therefore, the Indian Army has been reluctant to get involved in managing 'internal disturbances'. Over the years, the Government of India has created what has been called paramilitary forces, including the Border Security Force, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police and Central Industrial Security Force, to name a few. In addition, it has added to the strength of forces like the Central Reserve Police Force.
The Indian Army faced its first major confrontation with insurgency in Nagaland in the middle sixties. As Public Relations Officer of the Defence Ministry, based in Shillong, I had to interact with the media about the activities of the armed forces in the northeast.
I do recall a long briefing that I had from then Major General K. P.Candeth, about the Nagas and the task of the Indian Army to maintain peace in the area. He briefed me about the simplicity of the people of the area, whose loyalties were tribal in nature, but were motivated by 'foreign' forces who were interested in the area seceding from India. Those were the days when efforts were made to establish an accord with the Nagas with the help of Reverend Michael Scott.
Major General Candeth also briefed me about the task that he was facing in reorienting the Indian soldier as far as his task was concerned.
The 'insurgency' in Nagaland was only the beginning. The Mizos followed the Nagas. We have had trouble in Tripura, Manipur and Assam. The army had to deal with the situation in all northeastern states.
In the West, India had to fight internal disturbances in Punjab in the eighties. It was the first phase of proxy-war inflicted on the country by Pakistan. It was followed by 'militancy' that surfaced in Jammu and Kashmir in 1989.
The army had to assist the civil authorities both in Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir. While the disturbances in Punjab came to an end in the early nineties, the trouble in Kashmir is continuing.
I recall that General K. V. Krishna Rao, who was appointed the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir in 1989, was reluctant to use the army to fight the militants in the state and had conveyed it to then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. He resigned as Governor when the Government changed in Delhi. However, when he was sent to the state again in 1993, the army was fully involved in fighting insurgency in the state.
Much credit should go to General B. C. Joshi, who raised the Rashtriya Rifles in the early eighties to fight insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. He made every soldier swear by the "Ten Commandments" while performing duties in the state, to ensure that he does not treat the 'militant' as an 'enemy'.
The latest, and perhaps the most serious threat to internal security of the country is 'Left Wing Extremism'. Also known as Naxalites or Maoists, left wing extremists have been able to establish the 'red corridor' through Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Andhra, and parts of Maharashtra . They hope to 'liberate' the country through an armed rebellion.
The country has been debating for over a decade as to whether the armed forces should be used in fighting left-wing extremism. There is reluctance to deploy the armed forces to fight the Naxals. The author, Lt. Gen. (Retired) Rustom K. Nanavaty, has pointed out that, as stated in 1952 by the first Indian Commander in Chief, General K. M. Cariappa, the role of the army is to 'defend the country against external forces' aggression and help the civil and state governments in times of need'.
Different authorities have restated the role of the army, but as the author has stated, 'in substance, little has changed'.
Lt. Gen. Nanavaty has pointed out that the army must overcome the traditional reservations and inhibitions regarding its secondary role. As the last bastion of the nation's security, it has a responsibility to respond to the evolving security needs of the state and thereby ensure its continued relevance.
Lt. Gen. Nanavaty has also pointed out the need for training the army as also the Special Forces to enable them to fight left wing extremists and insurgents effectively. The government has created the Special Forces, but they have not received the training needed to fight insurgents, and consequently, have suffered heavy casualties on occasions.
It is time the army is used to train the forces if there is a reluctance to deploy the military, as the state governments is finding it difficult to 'control' the armed forces in fighting the militants. The author has also given an analysis of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which has been a subject of controversy in Jammu and Kashmir and in Manipur.
Nanavaty has underlined the need for synergizing security forces operations and intelligence, as also the use of information dissemination. He has pointed out that there is no effective coordination between the Directorate of Public Relations of the Ministry of Defence, which is the authorized information dissemination agency for the armed forces, and the Public Information Organisation of the Army, which has the task of conducting information warfare to aid the forces on the ground.
There are many lessons to be learnt if the country has to successfully deal with internal armed conflict in the country.
The basic principles, Lt. Gen. Nanavary points out are that the security forces engaged in internal armed conflict must conduct operations with restraint strictly in accordance with law.
There should be synergy in the conduct of operations, the forces should adopt a grid patter of deployment, the offensive operations should be based on intelligence and the forces must have the trust, respect and goodwill of the people.
The Department of Defence and Strategic Studies of Pune University and the Centre for Land and Warfare Studies which supported the research and the publication of the book, deserves to be complimented for persuading Lt .Gen. Rostum Nanavatty , who has had wide experience in fighting anti-national forces both in the West and the northeast to author the book (ANI)
Attn: News Editors/News Desks: Mr. I.Ramamohan Rao is a former Principal Information Officer, Government of India. He can be contacted at the following e-mail ID raoramamohan@hotmail.com.
Book Review.Internal Armed Conflict in India by Lt. Gen (Retd) Rostum K. Nanavatty.Pp 246. Pentagon Press. Rs. 595.
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